1. RESPONDENT DETAILS

1.1. Type of respondent - single choice reply - (compulsory)

I am answering this consultation on behalf of a company/organisation

Your details - Companies/Organisations

1.1.1. My company’s/organisation’s name may be published alongside my contribution. - single choice reply - (compulsory)

1.1.2. Company/Organisation name: - open reply - (compulsory)

BEUC (European Consumer Organisation)

1.1.5 What is your profile? - single choice reply - (compulsory)

1.1.5.1. If you are a company, what is the size of your company? - single choice reply - (compulsory)

1.1.5.2. If you are a non-governmental organisation, how many members does your organisation have? - single choice reply - (compulsory)

1.1.5.3. If you are a trade association, how many members does your association have? - single choice reply - (compulsory)

1.1.5.4. If you are a trade association representing businesses, please provide information on your members (number, names of organisations). - open reply - (compulsory)

1.1.5.5. If you are an organisation representing several non-governmental organisations, please provide information on your members (number, names of organisations). - open reply - (compulsory)

Our members are 40: Arbeiterkammer (Austria) Verein für Konsumenteninformation – VKI (Austria) Test-Achats (Belgium) Bulgarian national association active consumers - BNAAC (Bulgaria) Cyprus Consumers’ Association – CCA (Cyprus) dTest (Czech Republic) Forbrugerrådet (Denmark) Estonian consumers union - Eesti tarbijakaitse LIIT (Estonia) Kuluttajaliitto-Konsumentförbundet ry (Finland) The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) (Finland) Consommation, logement et cadre de vie – CLCV (France) UFC-Que choisir (France) Stiftung Warentest (Germany) Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband – vzvb (Germany) Consumers’ Protection Centre – KEPKA (Greece) EKPIZO (Greece) National Association for Consumer Protection - OFE (Hungary) NFACPH - FEOSZ (Hungary) Neytendasamtökin - NS (Iceland) Consumers’ Association of Ireland – CAI (Ireland) Altoconsumo (Italy) Consumatori Italiani per l’Europa (CIE) (Italy) Latvian National Association for Consumer Protection - LPIAA (Latvia) Alliance of Lithuanian Consumer Organisations (Lithuania) Union Luxembourgeoise des Consommateurs - ULC (Luxembourg) Consumers’ Organisation of Macedonia (Macedonia) Ghaqda Tal-Konsumaturi - CA Malta (Malta) Consumentenbond (Netherlands) Forbrukerrådet (Norway) Association of Polish Consumers – SKP (Poland) Polish Consumer Federation – Federacja Konsumentów (Poland) Deco (Portugal) Association for consumers’ protection – APC (Romania) Association of Slovak consumers (Slovakia) Zveza Potrošnikov Slovenije - ZPS (Slovenia) Confederación de consumidores y usuarios – CECU (Spain) Organización de consumidores y usuarios – OCU (Spain) Sveriges Konsumenter (Sweden) Fédération Romande des consommateurs (Switzerland) Which? (United Kingdom)

1.1.5.6. If you replied "other", please specify: - open reply - (compulsory)

1.1.6. In which country are the headquarters of your company/organisation located? - single choice reply - (compulsory)

In one of the EU28 Member States
A. Substantive investment protection provisions

Question 1: Scope of the substantive investment protection provisions

Question:
Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the objectives and approach taken in relation to the scope of the substantive investment protection provisions in TTIP?

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".

Preliminary statement: BEUC opposes additional investment-related provisions and in particular the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism, which would elevate individual foreign investors to equal standing with signatory governments and grant them greater procedural rights than domestic investors who do not have access to this parallel legal track. Considering also that the EU and US have some of the most trustworthy domestic judicial systems to which investors have access, there is no need for additional such extrajudicial enforcement. Substantive comments: The definition of which investments and investors are subject to the substantive protections must be limited to forms of property and investors that would be granted similar substantive protections in both US and EU member nation laws. However, the definition of investment in past FTAs and BITs and in the exemplar text provided would extend the substantive property rights protections to categories of activities and instruments that would not be provided the same substantive protections in domestic law. Of particular concern would be inclusion in the definition of an investment of vague concepts such as "assumption of risk", "commitment of other resources", "expectation of gain or profit", "certain duration" and even more generally "forms that an investment may take". Such highly subjective standards would grant excessive discretion in determining whether an actionable investment exists in the form of a veritable investment. While language should be added to make clear that such vague concepts are not to be used as a basis for determining whether an investment exists, a way to foreclose these risks would be to use definitions that require the commitment of capital or acquisition of real property or other tangible assets, so to
avoid unintended ever-expanding categories of deemed investments. A more general problem with attempting to define “investment” in an international treaty is the reality that the jurisprudence defining various property rights is a living doctrine. Even if a trade pact text were to include provisions that described the state of European property rights jurisprudence at any particular juncture, over time the pact could result in greater rights for foreign investors, as domestic jurisprudence continues to be refined. To solve this problem, a direct link to the domestic laws of the host country should be added. This could read: “investment means property, property right or property interest as defined under the applicable law of the respondent state at the time the alleged injury occurred.” Regarding the definition of an investor, requiring “substantial business activities” in the host country is a step in the right direction. However, “substantial” is not defined in the explanatory text, allowing for the possibility that companies with irrelevant shares of their business activities can lodge a claim or that foreign firms set up shell companies in a Party so as to launch an investor-state case against its policies or governmental actions. To foreclose these risks specific requirement of minimum percentages of annual average per capita employment of natural persons and purchases or sales of goods or services, and their relevant duration prior to the alleged injury must be explicitly defined so to avoid opportunistic “nationality planning”. Another critical aspect is ensuring that nationals of a given country are not challenging their own country’s regulations using offshore subsidiaries. Denial of benefit provisions must also be tightened to ensure a firm has substantial business activities in the home Party and the burden of proving that any TTIP investor protection provision applies must be borne by the investor who must prove the tightened standards noted above (see, among others, the Plama v. Bulgaria case under the Energy Charter Treaty where the investor-state arbitral tribunal ruled that a government must affirmatively invoke the denial of benefits provisions).

Question 2: Non-discriminatory treatment for investors

Question: Taking into account the above explanations and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the EU approach to non-discrimination in relation to the TTIP? Please explain.

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".
-open reply- (compulsory)

If an ISDS mechanism is included in the agreement, and if the referenced wording for the national treatment provision is kept, it would allow tribunals to interpret the text as a prohibition of regulatory actions resulting in de facto discrimination even when there is no facial or intentional discrimination involved. This interpretation could result in tribunal orders to compensate foreign firms for environmental, health and other public interest policies that are facially neutral but that have an inadvertent impact on foreign investors. For example, a governmental measure restricting hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) in natural gas production could be interpreted by a tribunal as a national treatment violation if most domestic energy companies did not yet use fracking as a primary method of gas extraction while the foreign investor launching the ISDS claim depended significantly on fracking. To limit national treatment claims against such facially non-discriminatory policies, the national treatment text should be explicitly limited to instances in which a measure is enacted for a primarily discriminatory purpose. Regarding the MFN text, the attempt to prevent the “importation of standards” is positive. However, the clarification that MFN does not cover ISDS procedures “provided for in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements” would be advisable as to limit satisfactorily the ability of foreign firms to import greater procedural rights from treaties signed with third Parties. Moreover, more comprehensive language should bar foreign investors from importing the substantive rights afforded in such treaties. For example, the proposed text would appear to allow investors, upon request, to access the more expansive, earlier definitions of substantive foreign investor rights such as indirect expropriation and FET from an EU member state’s earlier BITs. By doing so, the EU would expose itself to a broader array of investor-state challenges to domestic policies. The EC could close this loophole by explicitly excluding from the definition of “treatment” the substantive rights afforded in other BITs and agreements. We want to see implemented the declared intention to explicitly provide an exception for consumer protection, citizens, health, safety, environmental and other public interest measures in this section, but the proposed importation of GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV replicates weaknesses of those texts. Only 1 of 40 attempts to use these exceptions at the WTO has ever succeeded due to legal hurdles contained within the exception that would be replicated under the current proposal (https://www.citizen.org/documents/general-exception.pdf). For example, a government would first have to prove that the policy was designed to fulfill a public interest objective and that the policy was “necessary” for its fulfillment. An investor-state tribunal can demand high thresholds of necessity and it would have the discretion to require the State to prove that no less trade restrictive alternative measure existed and that the measure was not applied in a discriminatory manner or as a disguised restriction on investment, placing the State in the unenviable position of proving a negative. The EC should develop a more robust general exception that avoids these legal hurdles, particularly omitting any “necessity” test. Finally, the proposed general exception is not actually generalized as it would not apply to the claims most frequently and successfully used in investor-state claims: “fair and equitable treatment” and expropriation. Of the ISDS cases brought under U.S. FTAs and BITs in which the tribunal ruled in favor of the foreign investor, 74% of the claims were “successful” on the basis of FET violations (http://www.citizen.org/documents/MST-Memo.pdf). Halting tribunal rulings on the basis of such broad rights requires that public interest exceptions apply to those rights.

Question 3: Fair and equitable treatment

Question: Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the approach to fair and equitable treatment of investors and their investments in relation to the TTIP?

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".
-open reply- (compulsory)

The EC is correct to attempt to narrow the FET obligation, given the wide discretion that tribunals have employed in interpreting
vague FET provisions as expansive obligations for respondent States, including obligations to maintain a static regulatory environment and to respond to investors’ unlawful behavior in a manner that the tribunal deems proportional. However, the proposed text includes two extremely problematic provisions that replicate the flaws of prior pacts. First, the list defining FET includes “manifest arbitrariness” as a qualifying criterion. While the other criteria in the list are more precisely defined (e.g. “targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief), “manifest arbitrariness” is a more open-ended term that tribunals could interpret widely to rule against domestic measures taken in the public interest. For example, in S.D. Myers v. Canada, brought under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the tribunal concluded that a FET violation was one in which “an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international perspective” (S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Second Partial Award, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2002), at para.263). On the basis of this definition, the tribunal ruled that Canada had violated S.D. Myers’ right to “fair and equitable treatment” by banning the export of a hazardous waste called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) that is proven to be toxic to humans and the environment. Though the PCB export ban complied with a multilateral treaty encouraging domestic treatment of toxic waste, the tribunal deemed Canada’s non-discriminatory ban as “arbitrary” and ordered the government to compensate S.D. Myers with $5.6 million (http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf). Simply adding the qualifier “manifest” to “arbitrary” is not likely to rein in such overreaching tribunal interpretations. Instead, “manifest arbitrariness” should be eliminated from the FET language. Furthermore, the EC proposal’s allowance for tribunals to consider an investor’s “legitimate expectation” threatens to expose EU member countries to investor-state claims against policy reforms in the public interest. While the proposal ties the consideration of legitimate expectations to instances in which “a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a covered investment,” this qualifier is not likely to be sufficient to foreclose the risk to progressive policymaking. Under the proposed language, a tribunal could conceivably find that a government’s decision to respond to a financial crisis by restricting banks from dealing in risky derivatives, for example, frustrated a foreign bank’s legitimate expectation, based on communications from an earlier administration under a more lax regulatory framework that the bank would be free to engage in derivative trading. A tribunal could well reason that this statement of permissiveness toward derivatives was one “upon which the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain” its investment, and that the subsequent restriction on derivatives “frustrated” that legitimate expectation. Similar logic could be envisioned for policy responses to climate crises, emerging food safety concerns, or other areas in which governments choose to alter policies, despite the fact that doing so contradicts earlier statements by government officials, in response to emergent crises or consumer demands. To not expose such responsive policymaking to foreign firms’ demands for compensation, the provision regarding investors’ expectations should be deleted.

B. Investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS)

Question 7: Multiple claims and relationship to domestic courts

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on the effectiveness of this approach for balancing access to ISDS with possible recourse to domestic courts and for avoiding conflicts between domestic remedies and ISDS in relation to the TTIP. Please indicate any further steps that can be taken. Please provide comments on the usefulness of mediation as a means to settle disputes.

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".

Question 8: Arbitrator ethics, conduct and qualifications

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on these
procedures and in particular on the Code of Conduct and the requirements for the qualifications for arbitrators in relation to the TTIP agreement. Do they improve the existing system and can further improvements be envisaged?

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".

-open reply- (compulsory)

The EU proposal regarding arbitrator independence is an improvement over the current scant conflict-of-interest rules. Still, if ISDS is to be included, the proposed language should be strengthened as to include: a prohibition on those who seek to serve as tribunalists to also represent corporations in ISDS challenges; public disclosure of any indirect association with any party – State, investor or other tribunalists – in the case; and a process for removal of tribunalists for reasons of conflict and qualifications. While the text states that tribunalists shall “not be affiliated with or take instructions from any disputing party or the government of a Party with regard to trade and investment matters,” it does not bar selection of arbitrators affiliated with the foreign investor in ways unrelated to trade and investment. Nor would it appear to prevent the appointment of arbitrators who used to be affiliated with a disputing party in the past (even in a capacity related to trade and investment matters). Appointments of former employees, current Board members (as long as not responsible for trade and investment) or close (but not trade-related) business partners are still possible under the proposed text, even though they would violate the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, which are invoked by the same text. Concerning the removal of tribunalists after the identification of such conflicts: though the proposal stipulates that a party in the dispute can contest the other party’s arbitrator selection as a violation of conflict-of-interest rules, the contested tribunalist would not be removed unless the other party agrees, the arbiter removes herself, or the Secretary General of the ICSID decides she should be removed. The first scenario seems unlikely, the second one has rarely played out, and the third one does not inspire confidence that conflict-of-interest rules will be effectively enforced. Though the ICSID Convention contains a rule against conflicts of interest, only 4 attempts to disqualify arbitrators have ever been successful in ICSID’s 50-year history, while 37 attempts have failed (http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20140319_1). While the proposed conflict-of-interest language is stronger than that of ICSID, such wording risks being neutralized by delegating the ultimate decision back to ICSID, given its pattern of failed attempts to remove compromised arbitrators. The proposal to have the Committee on Services and Investment create a code of conduct for arbitrators represents an iterative improvement but it is not clear how effective this will be if the remaining core problem should be addressed: many investor-state claims are not encompassed by the above language to prevent an increasingly broad array of claims that are indeed covered by those protections, due to the vague rights that the treaties attempt to limit such expenditure is a welcome one. However, the proposed provisions are not likely to have prevented the recent surge in investor-state challenges to public interest policies, nor tribunals’ decisions against many of these policies, given that most of the claimed rights could not have been accurately described as “manifestly without legal merit” or “unfounded as a matter of law.” First, a careful definition of what “manifestly without legal merit” or “unfounded as a matter of law” should mean is included. Secondly, and most importantly, the remaining core problem should be addressed: many investor-state claims are not encompassed by the above two categories because indeed they do fall within the wide ambit of investor rights enshrined in most FTAs and BITs. The increase in investor-state claims owes not to the ability of investors to pursue claims outside of investor-state protections, but to their ability to pursue an increasingly broad array of claims that are indeed covered by those protections, due to the vague rights that the treaties grant to investors, to tribunals’ ample discretion to interpret those rights broadly and to the expansive definition of investor in past agreements. Until the substantive rights, definition of investment and tribunalists’ discretion are not narrowed, language to prevent claims not falling under those rights will have limited impact in preventing investor-state challenges and rulings against public interest measures.

Question 9: Reducing the risk of frivolous and unfounded cases

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on these mechanisms for the avoidance of frivolous or unfounded claims and the removal of incentives in relation to the TTIP agreement. Please also indicate any other means to limit frivolous or unfounded claims.

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".

-open reply- (compulsory)

The creation of an ISDS mechanism would bring to an increase of the expenditure of State resources on claims that are frivolous or legally unfounded. Pointing out that the best mean to avoid this would be not to include an ISDS mechanism into the agreement, the attempt to limit such expenditure is a welcome one. However, the proposed provisions are not likely to have prevented the recent surge in investor-state challenges to public interest policies, nor tribunals’ decisions against many of these policies, given that most of the claims could not have been accurately described as “manifestly without legal merit” or “unfounded as a matter of law.” First, a careful definition of what “manifestly without legal merit” or “unfounded as a matter of law” should mean is included. Secondly, and most importantly, the remaining core problem should be addressed: many investor-state claims are not encompassed by the above two categories because indeed they do fall within the wide ambit of investor rights enshrined in most FTAs and BITs. The increase in investor-state claims owes not to the ability of investors to pursue claims outside of investor-state protections, but to their ability to pursue an increasingly broad array of claims that are indeed covered by those protections, due to the vague rights that the treaties grant to investors, to tribunals’ ample discretion to interpret those rights broadly and to the expansive definition of investor in past agreements. Until the substantive rights, definition of investment and tribunalists’ discretion are not narrowed, language to prevent claims not falling under those rights will have limited impact in preventing investor-state challenges and rulings against public interest measures.

Question 10: Allowing claims to proceed (filter)

Some investment agreements include filter mechanisms whereby the Parties to the agreement (here the EU and the US) may intervene in ISDS cases where an investor seeks to challenge measures adopted pursuant to prudential rules for financial stability. In such cases the Parties may decide jointly that a claim should not proceed any further. Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what are your views on the use and scope of such filter mechanisms in the TTIP agreement?
The proposed addition of a filter in which regulators from both Parties may offer binding judgments on whether claims should be dropped for prudential reasons marks a significant improvement over standard U.S. and EU pacts that contain no such provision. It is critical that this filter step takes place early in the investor-state process so that resources are not needlessly expended in cases where claims are dismissed for prudential reasons. While this proposal is a welcome addition, a more effective means of filtering out undeserving claims would be to use an ex-ante regulatory and diplomatic screen. Under such a provision, investors would be required, before mounting an investor-state claim, to present their case to a panel of regulators and other officials from their own government. The panel would determine whether to allow the claim to proceed as an investor-state challenge to the other Party’s measures. Such panels would help diminish the extent to which investor-state proceedings impinge on governments’ right to regulate. Regulators in the investor’s home country would have the incentive to not allow cases to proceed if they were likely to infringe on the other government’s regulatory prerogatives, given a desire to not have to Respond to similarly overreaching cases from the other country’s investors. (The presence of foreign affairs officials on these screening panels would further help in vetting the merits of prospective investor-state cases, as they would be hesitant to incur the diplomatic costs of investor-state challenges launched against other governments if the claims were particularly spurious.) In addition, establishing this screen before the launch of a new investor-state case (as opposed to afterwards, as in the proposed filter provision) would prevent both parties from expending money for tribunal costs and legal fees for claims deemed unfit to proceed. The benefits in reduced costs and increased regulatory autonomy of this screening process would be amplified if it were not limited to claims affecting prudential financial measures, but instead applied to all investor-state claims. (Regulators serving on the screening panel would be selected based on the type of regulation at issue in the claim.) The EC should consider developing an ex-ante regulatory and diplomatic screening process for all ISDS claims in place of the proposed filter mechanism, providing a more effective check on unwarranted investor-state challenges. If, instead, the current filter proposal is kept, then the EC should expand the range of measures covered to those beyond financial regulations. The Parties could use such a filter, for example, to examine cases in which the general exception (hopefully a strengthened version of it) is invoked as a defense for challenged environmental, consumer protection, health, safety and other public interest measures. A regulatory check is just as important in such cases as in those implicating financial stability.

**Question 11: Guidance by the Parties (the EU and the US) on the interpretation of the agreement**

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".

**Non-disputing Parties in investor-state cases should indeed have the opportunity to inform tribunals how they believe the investor rights and other provisions of the pact should be interpreted, as provided for in this proposal. However, recent investor-state cases have shown that when not forced to heed such governmental input, tribunals have few qualms with ignoring it. For example, in the RDC v. Guatemala case brought under the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), three sovereign governments submitted comments to the tribunal as non-disputing Parties. Each argued that the substantive investor right at issue -- “fair and equitable treatment” -- should be interpreted narrowly as derived from State practice. But the tribunal simply rejected this input from three States, indeed noting that the States were in error in their interpretation of Customary International Law (CIL) and instead imported a much broader interpretation of “fair and equitable treatment” from another investor-state tribunal’s award (http://www.citizen.org/documents/RDC-vs-Guatemala-Memo.pdf). Such runaway tribunal interpretations could plausibly be reined in by the proposed provision allowing the Parties to the agreement to provide a new interpretation of the pact’s terms. However, while the proposal states that such an interpretation would be “binding” on tribunals, it is unclear what enforcement mechanism would make the revised terms any more “binding” than the original terms that failed to bind the tribunal. That is, if the Parties feel the need to provide a reinterpretation of the pact’s provisions because of “serious concerns as regards matters of interpretation,” as provided for in the proposal, then it is likely that those concerns were sparked by tribunal interpretations that overstepped the intended bounds of the original written terms. What then would keep tribunals from simply overstepping the newly-defined bounds? Indeed, in the RDC v. Guatemala case, the Parties to CAFTA had included an annex in the pact that tried to narrow the “fair and equitable treatment” obligation, given serious concerns that tribunals had been interpreting the provision too broadly. The insertion of that annex did not stop the RDC tribunal from once again using a broader interpretation, paying little heed to the added language (http://www.citizen.org/documents/rdc-v-guatemala-rebuttal.pdf). The proven difficulty in limiting tribunals’ ability to defy the opinions of States and the revisions of a pact’s terms indicate once again the fundamental dangers of investor-state dispute settlement. While some textual reforms, such as narrowing the scope of covered “investment” and the narrowing of substantive investor rights, can help somewhat in reining in the wide discretion of tribunals, they are unlikely to foresee close tribunals’ overreaching rulings against public interest policies.

**Question 12: Appellate Mechanism and consistency of rulings**

If you do not want to reply to this question, please type "No comment".

**Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on the creation of an appellate mechanism in TTIP as a means to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement.**

Non-disputing Parties in investor-state cases should indeed have the opportunity to inform tribunals how they believe the investor rights and other provisions of the agreement to correct the balance? Are these elements desirable, and if so, do you consider them to be sufficient?
Any ISDS mechanism, if included, should include a robust appellate mechanism. This may provide one of the better hopes of tempering the expansive decisions of tribunals that threaten the right to regulate. To be effective, it is critical that the mechanism allow appeals on the legal merits of the tribunal’s decisions, not merely attempts to correct factual errors or to contest major procedural miscarriages (as provided for in the extremely limited annulment mechanism). It is also critical that the appeals mechanism be established by the pact itself, rather than being included as language promising the future creation of such a mechanism. Certainly the non-binding language from the CETA text would be insufficient. That text does not even require the future creation of an appellate mechanism, but only requires a “forum” for the EU and U.S. governments to consult on the question of whether to create such a mechanism. But even when pacts have included binding language to create an appellate mechanism in the future, the promised mechanism has failed to materialize. For example, CAFTA stated, “Within three months of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Commission shall establish a Negotiating Group to develop an appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under this Chapter. The Commission shall direct the Negotiating Group to provide to the Commission, within one year of establishment of the Negotiating Group, a draft amendment to the Agreement that establishes an appellate body or similar mechanism.” (http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file328_4718.pdf). Nearly eight years have passed since CAFTA took effect in most participating countries, and no such amendment has been produced. If an appeals process is to be a reality under TTIP, it should be created by TTIP itself.

C. General assessment

What is your overall assessment of the proposed approach on substantive standards of protection and ISDS as a basis for investment negotiations between the EU and US?

Do you see other ways for the EU to improve the investment system?

Are there any other issues related to the topics covered by the questionnaire that you would like to address?

If you do not want to reply to these questions, please type "No comment".

A. The comments that follow need to be understood against the background that BEUC acknowledges the right for investors to have access to justice and compensation in case their rights have been unlawfully infringed, but that we question that ISDS mechanisms are the adequate answer to this. ISDS mechanisms have historically been included in trade deals among countries with highly different legal and judicial standards in order to protect foreign investors from unlawful expropriations and discriminatory measures. However, in the past few decades these provisions have in some cases escaped their original intent and been used to skirt national courts or even to challenge their decisions (see Phillip Morris vs. Australia case). The current FDI flows between the EU and the US prove that fears of lack of investment protection are not justified, as over 65% of US FDI flows are already directed to the EU, despite only 9 BITs are in place between the US and EU countries (UNCTAD). While investors and investments should be granted legitimate protection through strong investment protection provisions into the agreement, based on the fact that both parties have robust, developed legal systems for resolving disputes between foreign investors and government, no provision for ISDS should be included. One argument often brought forward by the EC is that current BITs lack improved provisions on, among others, transparency and accountability. However, only 8 EU countries have now in place a BIT with the US and according to Reg. 1219/2012 they can continue maintaining in place such agreements, this is not a sufficient reason to impose to the other 20 EU states unnecessary and harmful provisions. Another frequent pro-ISDS argument is that its exclusion will set a precedent for future agreements (e.g. with China). This is without acknowledging the fundamental difference between the legal and judicial systems of respectively US and EU on the one hand and China or any other countries with similar features on the other hand, that fundamentally could justify the application of an ISDS mechanism. B. Research has already highlighted valuable alternatives to ISDS mechanisms which would not have the same perverse effects. They include private risk insurance schemes, contract-based arbitration systems and the creation of an International Investment Court, which would solve once for all the inconsistencies deriving from the proliferation of private arbitration tribunals (UNCTAD). Another alternative is the inclusion of investment protection clauses in standard state-to-state dispute resolution provisions (e.g. allowing state parties to uphold the cause of an investor under specific circumstances, leaving untouched that host country national courts remain the main forum for private investment protection). C. The current public consultation: 1. does not pose the basic question whether stakeholders want at all an ISDS into the TTIP, taking for granted that it will be inevitably part of the agreement; 2. represents a debatable practice by the EC as it quotes as a template excerpts of the CETA ISDS provisions while CETA has not yet been initialed, its text is not available to the public and it has still to pass the democratic scrutiny of the EP. The EC should not initial the CETA agreement while a public consultation over its provisions is still open and it should withdraw ISDS from CETA and TTIP if the results of the consultation advocate for it. BEUC has provided technical inputs based on the questionnaire structure but it does not agree with the inclusion of an ISDS in TTIP: it would allow for foreign firms to challenge public policy decisions and discriminate domestic firms not having access to it. We advocate for its exclusion because we believe that as ordinary citizens and national companies, US and EU investors should use the functioning domestic court systems of the host country. TTIP shall not be creating two parallel judicial tracks.